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ABSTRACT 
 
 
While evidence continues to mount that democracies resort to military force reluctantly, the 
transition to democracy may in fact be a dangerous and conflictual one. With the eyes of 
the world now focused squarely on democratization, a reassessment of the relationship 
between regime change and inter-state conflict seems fitting. To date, the evidence remains 
mixed. No clear consensus has emerged on whether regime transition either increases or 
decreases conflict propensities. The research here builds on models of democratization and 
conflict by including a more fully specified vector of conflict variables and by using an 
updated set of cases. Further, interaction effects are explored to assess whether factors such 
as power or contiguity differentially impact the conflict propensity of transitioning states. 
Employing a generalized estimating equation with logit and poisson specifications, the 
results show that change towards democracy decreases the probability of involvement in 
militarized inter-state disputes and wars. However, uneven or “rocky” transitions are found 
to increase conflict likelihood.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
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Introduction 
   In recent years, many Western democracies have adopted strategies in their foreign 
policies that emphasize the promotion of democracy. The fostering of democracy is an explicit 
goal of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy since the early 1990s. 
Democracy is a requirement for countries to be considered for European Union membership. 
Thus, the Union plays a major role in the shaping of the domestic policies of the Eastern 
European candidate countries. In addition, the EU presses democracy in its external assistance 
programs which considers progress in implementing institutional reforms for human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance as an element in defining allocations for 
individual countries. Similarly, the Bush administration lists the promotion of democracy as a 
strategic goal of U.S. foreign policy. The main reason to push the advancement of democracy is 
the belief of policy makers that a more democratic world would also be a more peaceful one. As 
the High Representative of the European Union, Javier Solana, puts it: “Our common mission is 
to defend and expand the boundaries of stable, durable and peaceful democracy; to share with 
others the rights and opportunities we enjoy.”1  
  This optimistic expectation shared by Western policymakers has its origin at least in part 
in the findings of academic research. There is empirical evidence that democracies do not fight 
each other (Bremer 1992). Increasingly, research shows that democracies generally are less 
involved in wars than autocracies, although the findings are somewhat mixed. Gleditsch and 
                                                          
1 Speech held at a meeting of the Foreign Policy Association in New York, May 7th 2003. 
http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/discours/75674.pdf  
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Hegre (1997) show that after 1945, democracies are less likely to initiate wars. They argue that 
the variation in level of democracy over time may cause the lack of an overall consistent pattern 
at the nation-state level. If democracies do engage in wars, they tend to be the winners because 
they select the conflicts they get involved in more carefully. Democratic leaders want to remain 
in office and be reelected; therefore, they are reluctant to engage in war unless they are sure of 
winning (Bueno de Mesquita 1995, 1999). Reiter and Stam (1998) show that democratic states 
fight with higher military effectiveness in terms of logistics, initiative and leadership.  
Additionally, the last decades have been evidenced by an increasing number of 
democracies in the world. Among the first to make the transition to democracy were the southern 
European countries Spain, Portugal and Greece in the 1970s. These were then followed by a 
number of democratic transitions in Latin America starting in the late 1970s. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the consequent democratization in Eastern European countries mark the peak 
in these developments. Combined with the empirical findings of democracies’ foreign policy 
behavior, this third wave of democratization should be a reason for expectations of an 
increasingly peaceful world (Huntington 1991).2  
The problem with this inference is, however, that the road that leads to democracy, the 
process of democratization, may not be a peaceful one. Transitions are periods of great 
instability. Old elites are threatened in their positions and may resort to violence to secure their 
leadership. Opposition movements may not yet have established effective control and thus be 
                                                          
2 However, Huntington considers potential setbacks to the recent wave of democratization. He argues that lack of 
past democratic experience, non-Western orientation, and insufficient economic progress could lead to reversals 
(Huntington, pp. 290-316). 
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subject to challenges. Transitions are processes involving high levels of uncertainty (O’Donnell 
1986). Snyder (2000) argues that democratization may unleash ethnic conflicts because elites use 
nationalism as a catalyst in the face of weakened institutions. Several studies show that 
transitional processes indeed increase the likelihood of violent conflict (Mansfield and Snyder 
1995, 2002). This would mean that the foreign policy goals of today’s Western leaders could 
imply high risks in the short term. Others, however, challenge these findings and do not find a 
relationship between regime change and conflict (Thompson and Tucker 1997). The nature of the 
transition process was neglected in early research. Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) show that 
“rocky”, uneven transitions increase the likelihood of war (irregardless of whether it is 
autocratization or democratization), whereas smooth transitions to democracy decrease the 
likelihood of war involvement. It seems, then, that the relationship remains indeterminate and 
more evidence is still required to fully understand the complex nature of these processes. 
This study re-examines the process of regime transition. Is democratization (and 
autocratization) related to interstate conflict? 3 And, what effect might democratization have on 
conflict or war likelihood? Furthermore, why do some transitions result in violent interstate 
conflict, while others pass peaceful and smooth? These are the basic questions this paper 
addresses. As policy makers actively support democratization, the answers to these questions are 
obviously pertinent. A more complete understanding of regime transition will hopefully enable 
political elites to craft policies that encourage a smooth path towards democracy. 
This paper is an empirical study of the relationship between regime transition and violent 
interstate conflict from 1950-2000. Expanding on earlier research by Mansfield and Snyder 
(1995, 2002) and Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000), the impact of regime transition on conflict 
                                                          
3 I focus on interstate conflict in this paper. However, it would also be interesting to investigate the impact of regime 
change on civil conflict and how these civil conflicts externalize.  
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involvement is reexamined, but with a more updated set of cases and a more fully specified 
model of interstate conflict. Further, rather than simply assess whether a relationship exists 
between regime transitions and conflict, this research investigates the specific factors pushing 
transitioning states toward or away from violent conflict. This analysis will provide a more 
nuanced understanding of regime change and foreign policy decision-making.  
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Democracy, Transition, and Conflict 
While evidence for a democratic peace remains robust to recent theoretical and empirical 
challenges, transitions to and away from democracy potentially tell a different story. After the 
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, violent conflict occurred in several of the 15 newly 
independent states. Georgia, for example, made some progress toward democracy but is 
nevertheless involved in violent conflict in its regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The lack of 
developed institutions and democratic values among the population, coupled with a rapid 
expansion of the electorate led to the election of a strong nationalist president. Gamsakhurdia 
seized dictatorial powers and propagated exclusionary nationalism favoring Georgians as the 
former titular nation.4 He was overthrown in a coup by his successor Shewardnaze in 1992. 
Although the country under Shevardnadze made progress toward democracy on paper, the record 
is at best mixed in its dealings with ethnic minorities.5 He continued to effectively suppress 
Georgia’s regionally concentrated minorities. Violent clashes in Abkhazia were followed by 
Russian intervention which ended in a defeat of the Georgians. Thus, newly democratizing states 
might not dispose of the same features as stable, mature democracies do. The democratic norms 
and procedures existing in consolidated democracies are not yet established. Regime transitions 
involve great levels of uncertainty which may provide incentives for political elites to appeal to 
nationalism to ensure popular support. This evidence, while admittedly anecdotal, suggests that 
polities in transition face a set of challenges rarely encountered by more stable democratic states. 
                                                          
4 This is linked to the fact that the movement for Georgian independence was based on Georgian exclusionary 
nationalist ideas and excluded other minorities from participation (Jones 1997). 
5 Georgia scores a five on the combined polity score since 1992 which would suggest a rather democratic regime. 
However, many researchers would fundamentally disagree with this coding  (Jones 1997: 515).  
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As such, a more complete understanding of the transition process will undoubtedly help explain 
the relationship between domestic political institutions and interstate conflict. 
To be sure, the evidence for conflictual regime transitions remains mixed. Controversy 
swirls around theoretical specification, concept operationalization, and statistical estimation. 
More pointedly, though, models of regime change largely fail to account for even the most 
obvious conflict variables. Not only should models of transition look to the democratic peace for 
influences on foreign policy decision-making, but models of transition also must incorporate 
factors that clearly contribute to conflict occurrence.  
Three areas of research are particularly important for this research question. When 
looking at democratization, one has to consider the work on the democratic peace. There is 
strong and consistent evidence that democracies do not fight each other. However, immense 
scholarly work shows increasingly more ways in which regime type impacts a state’s conflict 
behavior at the monadic and systemic level of analysis. Second, how do these results relate to the 
foreign policy behavior of transitioning states? Does the democratic peace extend to 
democratizing states as well? Some work suggests that democratization increases the risk of war, 
whereas other research shows that the specific nature of the transition process impacts its conflict 
propensity. Third, as conflict is the dependent variable in the model used here, it is important to 
take into account the findings of the conflict literature. The first two strands of research often 
neglect these by not or insufficiently controlling for variables such as power, contiguity, 
satisfaction with the status quo or other conflict variables.  
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The Liberal Peace 
Liberal ideology grounds the democratic peace. What defines democracy, basic freedoms 
of speech, press, and religion, coupled with elected and accountable leaders and a general 
tolerance for different viewpoints, explains expectations of non-violence and mutual compromise 
between democratic nations. Political leaders in democracies rely on the consent of civil society, 
a fact emphasized in the political philosophy of Kant: “If the consent of the citizens is required to 
decide that war should be declared, nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious 
in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war” (Kant 
1957[1795]: 13).  
Scientific research has corroborated these expectations. Democracies do not fight war 
against each other (Levy 1988, Bremer 1980, Bremer 1992, Maoz and Abdolali 1989, Oneal and 
Russett 1999). Being an empirical finding, many scholars drew on classic liberal arguments to 
theoretically account for this relationship. Despite diverse realist and statistical challenges, this 
finding proved robust and consistent.6 Recent extensions also confirmed the validity of this 
finding for militarized interstate disputes, showing that democratic pairs do not fight each other 
(Russett and Oneal 2001). Besides,  democratic leaders select the conflicts they get involved in 
more carefully since they are accountable for the decision to use force and thus, they win a 
disproportionate share of the wars they fight (Bueno de Mesquita 1995). Democratic elites know 
that their position depends on successful policy, such, they are also inclined to shift extra 
resources into the war effort. This also increases the probability to win wars (Bueno de Mesquita 
                                                          
6 One example is the finding by Maoz and Abdolali (1989) that democratic states get involved in war with non-
democratic states as often as other regimes (Maoz and Abdolali 1989). This result, however, may be due to the 
operationalization of the regime type variable and the applied statistical testing. Maoz and Abdolali (1989) use 
simple correlations and chi-square tests which may not be sufficient.  
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et al. 1999).7 Finally, jointly democratic dyads involved in disputes choose more peaceful 
methods of settlement than other pairs of states. (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997, Dixon 1994, 
Mousseau 1998, Raymond 1994)  
Studies at the systemic level translate the findings at the dyadic level to the international 
system as a whole. Gleditsch and Hegre (1997) find some support (though not conclusive) for a 
curvilinear relationship between the level of democracy and the occurrence of war. Mitchell et al. 
(1999) find evidence for a negative relationship between democracy and war as the percentage of 
democracies increases after 1945; however, the opposite effect is present for the period 
immediately after World War I. The authors argue that it may just take time for democratic 
norms to develop. Recent research suggests that indeed democratic norms seem to become more 
prevalent as the international system gets more democratic. Mitchell (2002) finds that as the 
proportion of democracies increases, the likelihood of third-party intervention into peaceful 
settlements among non-democracies increases as well. Thus, the growing number of democracies 
in the international system influences the dispute settlement behavior of both democracies and 
non-democracies.8  
Less evidence for the democratic peace proposition has been found at the monadic, the 
nation-state level. Initially, studies focused on the frequency of conflicts for the different regime 
types and did not find a significant difference between democratic and autocratic states.9 As 
                                                          
7 Reiter and Stam (1998) further confirm these findings by showing that democracies fight more effectively because 
of better initiative, as well as superior leadership.  
8 Although this result does not necessarily show that non-democracies behave more democratically because of 
spreading norms. Mitchell finds that third-party intervention in peaceful settlements becomes more likely for both 
democracies and autocracies. First, this may be due to a general increase in third-party interventions over the studied 
time span; second, we do not know whether this increase can be attributed to the changed behavior of the autocratic 
states (as the author suggests) or to the different foreign policy behavior of the increasing number of democracies (as 
other democratic peace research might argue).  
9 Morgan and Campbell (1991) found that that high degrees of political constraint on the executive (as in democratic 
countries) reduce the likelihood of war involvement for major powers. No support, however, was found for the same 
relationship among minor powers.   
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Macmillan points out, this weakens theories on the dyadic findings because they fail “to explain 
why liberal states should be peace prone only in relations with other liberal states” (MacMillan 
2003: 233). A shift in scholarly attention from a mere occupation with frequency to more 
specific analyses of the willingness and circumstances in which democratic states fight wars puts 
this “separate peace” position further into question. Rousseau et al. (1996) find support for the 
contention that “democracies are less likely to initiate crises with all other types of states.” 
Gleditsch and Hegre (1997) find that democracies are generally very unlikely to engage in war 
except as in the situation of protracted high-tension disputes.  
Explanations for the peace proneness of democratic states focus on norms, institutions or 
signaling arguments. Normative or cultural arguments emphasize the emergence of liberal norms 
within democracies that translate into a different foreign policy behavior. Decisionmakers “will 
try to follow the same norms of conflict resolution as they have developed within the domestic 
political process” (Russett 1996: 96). In addition, democratic leaders expect the same tendency 
toward peaceful methods of conflict resolution by other liberal democracies, thus uncertainty 
between democratic states is greatly reduced. The second part of the argument suggests a dyadic 
democratic peace, whereas the first part implies that democratic states in general are more peace 
prone. The normative theory, however, fails to explain the extent of a change in the foreign 
policy behavior of democratic states. It remains unclear if changed behavior pertains to other 
democracies only or to non-democracies as well.  
Institutional explanations, as put forward by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) criticize the 
norms argument as being ad-hoc, inductive and unable to explain wars fought by democracies 
against substantially weaker states.  Bueno de Mesquita et al. stress the importance of selection 
effects that make democratic leaders unlikely to engage in war unless they are not sure of 
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winning. Democratic elites depend upon successful policy, which in consequence makes them 
unattractive targets. Yet, if democratic leaders use force and perform poorly, they might resort to 
violence to divert from unsuccessful policies. Institutional theory centers on electoral 
accountability as a constraint for conflict prone behavior.  
A third strand of literature focuses on signaling and audience costs as factors limiting 
conflictual behavior, suggesting that “democracies should be able to signal their intentions to 
other states more credibly and clearly than authoritarian states can” (Fearon 1994: 577). All three 
theoretical accounts limit their analysis to stable, mature democracies. Yet, the ability of nascent 
democratic institutions to serve as constraints on decision-makers and to effectively confirm the 
credibility of tacit signaling may be significantly undermined in transitioning polities.  
 
Transitioning States  
The findings on the democratic peace stand in partial contrast to the findings on 
democratization and war. Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 2002a, 2002b), for example, conclude 
that whatever is true for consolidated democratic regimes does not hold for states in  transition to 
democracy. Using Polity II data (Gurr 1989), Mansfield and Snyder (1995) find transitioning 
states to be more war prone than stable states. Surprisingly, they observe transitions towards 
democracy to be particularly conflictual, although states undergoing high change from 
democracy to autocracy have the highest probability of war involvement. Mansfield and Snyder 
(1995) distinguish between democracies, anocracies, and autocracies by establishing thresholds 
for these regime types. This operationalization is problematic, especially since anocracy is an 
insufficiently defined and rather obscure construct.  Also, the use of ordinary logistic regression 
does not take into account the nature of the data under analysis which may lead to biased and 
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inefficient estimation. Omitted variable bias, however, arguably presents the most significant 
limitation of their model. The authors fail to introduce variables that control for rival 
explanations, such as major power status, capabilities, contiguity or foreign policy preferences. 
Thompson and Tucker (1997a) replicate the study by Mansfield and Snyder (1995), but 
cannot confirm Mansfield and Snyder’s (1995) positive relationship between democratization 
and war. They criticize Mansfield and Snyder’s application of chi-square tests since it is 
“equivalent to the regression of analog of testing whether a set of parameters is equal to zero” 
(Thompson and Tucker 1997a: 442). Thus, a significant result merely indicates if their 
parameters (autocratization, democratization and stable states) together are related to war, it does 
not allow one to conclude which one of the three is related to war. Applying more appropriate 
statistical tests, Thompson and Tucker (1997a) find strong evidence that democratization is 
independent from war occurrence, whereas “autocratization, compared to no regime change, is 
significantly related to war involvement” (Thompson and Tucker 1997a: 445).  
In response to critiques, Mansfield and Snyder (2002a, 2002b) reanalyze their data, now 
differentiating between complete and incomplete transitions to autocracy or democracy. They 
find that states in the incomplete stage of a transition to democracy have heightened conflict 
propensities. However, a similar relationship between incomplete autocratic transitions and war 
is not observed. Theorizing that the degree of concentrated domestic authority might in part 
explain the relationship between polity transition and war, Mansfield and Snyder (2002a) test for 
interaction effects. Testing for interactive effects between the four regime change dummy 
variables and the degree of concentration of domestic authority (2002a), the results indicate that 
incomplete democracies possessing weakly concentrated domestic authorities are especially war  
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prone.10 These relationships hold up even after controlling for major power status, material 
capabilities, and the presence of a civil war. The major power and the capabilities variable are 
positive and highly significant. Further, Mansfield and Snyder (2002a) correct for 
methodological weaknesses, such as panel heteroskedasticity by using robust standard errors and 
introduce a natural spline function with three knots to account for temporal dependence.11  
Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) develop more refined measures of polity change.12 
Rather than establish categorical distinctions for polity change, which will always be arbitrary, 
Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) instead use the change scores themselves. Using continuous 
measures for polity change and variance, plus a dummy distinction for direction of change, 
Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) find a significant and negative relationship between overall 
change towards democracy and conflict. This suggests that democratization decreases conflict 
propensities, although this result does not hold if democratization occurs during an ongoing war, 
which provides some support for the dangerous democratization hypothesis (Gleditsch and Ward 
2000).  Interestingly, though, direction of change is positively related to war, indicating that 
changes towards democracy are dangerous. This result arguably contradicts their other finding 
that larger changes toward democracy are associated with smaller probabilities of war 
involvement. These contradictory results may be due to the fact that direction of change and 
change in democracy scores both measure direction (since change is coded from -20 to 20, 
                                                          
10 It is interesting that the authors use Polity III data for the regime change variables, but include a variable from the 
Polity II data to interact the degree of authority concentration with the change variables. Thompson and Tucker 
(1997b) note that “empirically, the concentration variable is more characteristic of autocracies than democracies” 
(466).  Thus, states with the same polity scores receive higher values in Mansfield and Snyder’s interactions if they 
are more autocratic. In addition, results are not presented without the interaction terms, which makes the 
interpretation of the main effects difficult.  
11 However, their modeling choices are not sufficiently explained. In their results, the authors present a base model, 
a model for country-specific fixed effects, a model controlling for regime type and a model excluding major wars. It 
is not clear what a fixed effects model should do for an analysis that already corrects for temporal and spatial 
dependency.  
12 The 1998 article does not employ any control variables. They include factors to account for contiguous effects of 
democratization on conflict as well as major power status and peace years in their 2000 article. Interestingly, the 
authors use one tailed tests in their model. 
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direction from -1 to 1). Gleditsch and Ward (1998) further observe uneven or “rocky” transitions 
to be especially war prone. Countries that have high variance in change scores show increased 
conflict probabilities.13 This seems to be consistent with Mansfield and Snyder’s (1995) earlier 
finding that large change from democracy to autocracy significantly increases the likelihood of 
conflict likelihood.  
All of the above mentioned studies are conducted at the monadic level. Dyadic studies of 
regime transition remain rare. Oneal and Russett (1999) investigate the relationship between 
regime change and militarized interstate disputes for politically relevant dyads from 1950-1985. 
They authors test for the impact of change toward a coherent democracy (and autocracy 
respectively) on conflict and do not find a significant relationship.14 To measure change more 
gradually, Oneal and Russett determine if a country changed toward democracy (or autocracy) 
over a one year lag, which does not give significant results, although this might be due to the 
short time lag used. In a replication of this study, Mansfield and Snyder (2002b) use a different 
operationalization of regime change but keep Oneal and Russett’s (1999) control variables.15 
They assess the impact of incomplete and complete transition processes on MIDs at the dyadic 
level. In contrast to the findings of Oneal and Russett, the authors show that incomplete 
democratization in one or both of the countries comprising the dyad increases the likelihood of a 
MID. This is consistent with their earlier, monadic findings on democratization and war (see 
Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002a), but contrasts with other findings of the (dyadic) democratic 
                                                          
13 Gleditsch and Ward (2000) differentiate between conflict onset and ongoing conflicts, and show that high 
variance increases probabilities of remaining in ongoing wars, but not conflict onset itself. 
14 Democratization is defined as a change in polity scores from clearly autocratic (<-6) to clearly democratic (>6) 
persisting over five years, autocratization as change from democratic (>6) to autocratic (<-6), lasting five years as 
well. The authors admit that this operationalization is problematic since very few countries experience such large 
changes that then remain stable, and it furthermore excludes all changes in the in-between categories.   
15 Mansfield and Snyder (2002b) construct four dummy variables for complete and incomplete transitions to 
democracy or autocracy and use one-tailed tests for these variables, expecting a positive relationship. This is 
questionable since one might expect that complete transition to democracy might decrease MID likelihood.  
  14  
peace, since they do not find a significant relationship for complete democratization or 
autocratization and MIDs.16 Diehl and Goertz (2000) do show that rivalries in transition, 
regardless of the direction of polity change, are especially war prone. Yet, the fact that they look 
at countries that already are in some form of conflictual relationship combined with the low 
number of cases limits the generalizability of this result.17  
 Evidence on the relationship between regime transition and conflict thus remains mixed.  
Some findings show no relationship between regime change and conflict (Thompson and Tucker 
1997, Oneal and Russett 1997), while others observe positive or negative relationships between 
democratization and conflict (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002a, 2002b, Gleditsch and Ward 
1998, 2000). Some evidence points to the specific nature of the transition process as a 
determinant of conflict such as high variance in regime scores (Gleditsch and Ward 1998, 2000).   
 
A Conflict Model 
Most of the research on the relation between democratization and conflict suffers from 
omitted variable bias. The dependent variable in the above mentioned research is conflict, but 
scholars have often failed to control for variables other than ones directly linked to the transition. 
It is argued here that factors that are known to cause conflict must be included to build a more 
fully specified model of democratization and conflict. The systematic, scientific study of the 
causes of war and interstate conflict goes back to the works of Richardson (1960a) and Wright 
(1964). Since then, evidence identifying empirical patterns that are strongly related to the onset 
                                                          
16 As the democratic peace suggests, one should expect recently consolidated democracies to be significantly less 
war-prone, and consolidating autocracies to be more war prone.  Since Mansfield and Snyder (2002) conduct only 
one-tailed tests and expect the relationship for all regime changes to be positive, the threshold for a negative and 
significant relationship between consolidated democracies and conflict likelihood is substantially lowered.  
17 46 out of 202 rivalries were in transition. 
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of war has mounted considerably, suggesting that power, contiguity, alliance, preferences and 
regime type are important variables related to conflict likelihood.  
Realist scholars claim that power is the main explanatory variable determining conflict. 
Realism holds that the anarchical character of the international system leads state to pursue 
power to ensure their survival. Since the international system lacks a “government over 
governments”, states can never be certain about another state’s intentions (Mearsheimer 2001: 
30). The maintenance of territorial integrity and sovereignty are the primary goals of states, 
which, coupled with uncertainty, drives states to maximize power. The causes of war, then, lie in 
the distribution of power in the international system (Mearsheimer 2001). Analyzing the 
frequency of wars and battles, Wright (1964) shows that major powers are more conflict prone 
than small states. Using the Correlates of War database, Small and Singer (1970, 1982) find that 
major powers are much more likely to engage in violent conflict than minor powers. Employing 
a composite index consisting of military expenditures, military personnel, the amount of energy 
production, iron and steel production, urban population and total population, Bremer (1980) 
shows that a  country’s national capabilities have a strong and positive effect on the occurrence 
of interstate war. In a study reviewing more than 500 quantitative studies on interstate conflict, 
Geller and Singer (1998) confirm the importance of power status for war likelihood.  
In addition, scholars have pointed to the salience of contiguity as a factor for conflict 
proneness. There is strong evidence of a positive correlation between the number of borders and 
conflict involvement (Most and Starr 1976, Holsti 1991, Gochman 1990a, Vasquez 1993, 1995, 
2000). Violent conflict is “much more frequent between contiguous states than non-contiguous 
states” (Vasquez 1993:128). According to Vazquez (1993), more than 80% of all interstate wars 
since 1648 and two-thirds of all militarized interstate disputes have been fought between 
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contiguous states. Yet, the theoretical arguments explaining this relationship differ considerably. 
Richardson (1960b) argues that proximity simply provides the opportunity for conflict. States 
that share borders thus have more physical opportunities for war because of short distances. 
Vasquez (1995) criticizes that proximity (the number of neighbors) is a relative constant, which 
in consequence “cannot be the cause of something fairly infrequent, like war” (Vasquez 1995: 
280). Proximity provides the opportunity for war, but does not explain when and why war 
occurs.  
A second, but related argument centers on increased interaction opportunities for 
neighboring countries because of regional proximity. Conflicts of interests are expected to occur 
more often between neighbors than states that are far apart from each other. Gochman (1990) 
therefore predicts that technological innovations will diminish the impact of the number of 
borders on war involvement, but finds that the number of borders is associated with even more 
interstate conflict after 1870. In addition, increased interaction opportunities have facilitated 
economic cooperation which has been shown to reduce conflict likelihood (Oneal and Russett 
1999, 2001). This is another flaw in the interactions argument.  
The third approach, as represented by Vasquez (1993, 1995, 2000) argues that underlying 
territorial issues cause contiguous states go to war with each other. Territorial disputes are likely 
to arise among bordering states and unless these issues are resolved, contiguous states will be far 
more conflict prone than others. Vasquez and Henehan (2001) categorize militarized interstate 
disputes for different types of disputes involved (territory, policy, regime, and other) and show 
that although territorial disputes comprise only 35% of the sample, they produce 55% of the 
wars. This indicates that unresolved territorial claims result in much higher war proneness than 
  17  
other types of disputes. This argument is compelling since it explains cooperation as well as 
conflict among neighboring states.18  
Power transition theory stresses the importance of status quo evaluations on the 
likelihood of interstate conflict. Dissatisfaction with the status quo, especially for great powers, 
is expected to increase the likelihood of violent interstate conflict (Organski 1958, Bueno de 
Mesquita 1975, Organski and Kugler 1980, Kugler and Lemke 1996, 2000). Bueno de Mesquita 
(1975) developed a measure of foreign policy preference similarity that captures states’ 
satisfaction with the international status quo, Kendall’s τb.19 Focusing on the dyadic level, 
subsequent research demonstrated that status quo evaluations are powerful predictors for wars 
(Kim 1991, 1992, 1996). Evidence shows that states that are dissatisfied with the international 
status quo are more likely use force than states that are satisfied (Rousseau et al. 1996). Gartzke 
(1998, 2000) argues that the findings of the democratic peace are a result of preference similarity 
among democracies. One important weakness of measures of preference similarity is the 
emphasis on the dyadic level of analysis. The monadic variant measures preference similarity 
with the current system leader, which means that all countries are compared to the most powerful 
state in the system. This is not a very sophisticated measure since one might expect that there are 
regional powers that have also an impact on preference similarity. For example, relations with 
Russia are still very important for the former Soviet Union republics. Russia’s military 
intervention in Abkhazia could be taken as one example in which preference dissimilarity in a 
regional context has contributed to a militarized interstate dispute. 
                                                          
18 Recently, concern with the data used to measure contiguity has grown. Gleditsch and Ward (2000, 2001) note that 
the COW contiguity data, which is the most commonly used in the literature, lacks a substantial documentation and 
develop a new dataset (Gleditsch and Ward 2001).   
19 Signorino and Ritter (1999) point to weaknesses in Bueno de Mesquita’s τb measure and develop an alternative 
measure of the similarity of foreign policy positions, S.  
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The conflict literature has so far failed to control for the effects of regime change on 
conflict and for possible moderating effects of regime change on conflict variables such as power 
or contiguity. Although much research on conflict controls for regime type, the impact of regime 
change is usually neglected. Most research assumes that states are stable over time, a proposition 
that might be questionable. Internal instability such as a regime transition might increase conflict 
likelihood. In addition, transitioning states might show different conflict behavior than stable 
states, which can be tested through the use of interaction effects.  
The model developed here includes a nation’s capabilities, satisfaction with the status quo 
and contiguity as explanatory variables, and combines them with others that are genuinely 
related to the transition process. Through the use of interaction variables, this research also aims 
to refine models on conflict that do not consider a state’s instability as a factor. The following 
section discusses two cases of regime transitions in the Ukraine and Georgia. The focus will be 
placed on the impact of the transition on foreign policy behavior, but also take other factors into 
account. 
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Illustrative Cases in the Former Soviet Union: Ukraine and Georgia 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 obliged all union republics to contemplate 
independence, regime change, economic reform and nation-building all at the same time. Each 
former republic began the process of regime transition at the same time as it initiated the 
development of a foreign policy. Two of these former republics will be examined: the Ukraine 
and Georgia. Both demonstrate that the process of regime transition influenced foreign policy 
decision-making. Yet, I will also show that other factors shaping foreign policy, such as power 
considerations, neighbors, and preference similarity have to be taken into account as well.   
 
Ukraine 
The Ukraine was one of the economically most productive and strategically important 
Soviet republics. In addition, a large part of the Soviet military was stationed in the Ukraine. The 
Russian Black Sea fleet was located in the Crimea, a region that had been transferred to the 
Ukraine only in 1954. According to the 1989 Soviet census, 73% of the 52 million people in the 
Ukraine identified themselves as Ukrainian, 22% as ethnically Russian, and 1% as Belorussians 
and Jews (Laitin 2001: 843). However, the politics of Russification and the long-term union with 
Russia (especially in Central and Eastern Ukraine) led to the emergence of multiple identities 
among the population (Kuzio 2000b: 149).20  Many Ukrainians do not perceive themselves as 
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fundamentally distinct from Russians with whom they share a similar language, culture and 
religious tradition (Diuk 2001:58). A split runs more along regional lines with a stronger 
emphasis on national identity and a distinct heritage in Western Ukraine, caused by the Habsburg 
heritage of these regions and their later incorporation into the USSR.   
 
Regime Transition  
The Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 on Ukrainian soil, combined with signs of 
perestroika and glasnost from Moscow, created a climate in which Ukrainian independence and 
regime change became an issue among intellectuals and other significant parts of the population. 
The People’s Movement for Restructuring, Rukh, was founded in 1989 and emphasized ideas of 
Ukrainian identity. Rukh supported democratization, linguistic renewal and economic autonomy 
from Russia, although initially within a renewed Soviet Union (Abdelal 2002:468).  The 1990 
parliamentary elections were the first elections in which parties other than the Communists could 
compete, although other parties had only one month to campaign and were not represented in all 
districts. The Communist Party won the clear majority, and only 25% of the seats went to the 
new democratic bloc that was sympathetic to the ideas of Rukh (Motyl and Krawchenko 1997: 
248).   
The inability of parliament speaker Vladimir Ivashko to hold back the unfolding national 
movement led to the elevation of Leonid Kravchuk to this position.21 Former Ideological 
Secretary Kravchuk, however, realized that an independent state would offer more opportunities 
for Ukrainians to gain power than a Russophile, centralized Soviet Union. Against expectations, 
“he became one of the most forthright defenders of Ukrainian sovereignty – the only position, as 
he no doubt realized, that permitted him to retain power, keep the conservatives and Gorbachev 
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at bay, and continue to court the nationalists” (Motyl and Krawchenko 1997: 250). Rukh’s ideas 
appealed to Kravchuk and soft liners in the CP as it had “at its core the attainment of statehood 
for the Ukrainian people, whom Rukh carefully defined in non-ethnic terms that permitted 
Russians, Jews and others to take part in and support its cause” (ibid). Kravchuk was thus able to 
satisfy demands for sovereignty by nationalist groups as well as to provide an incentive for soft 
liners among Communists to follow his lead.  
The decisive moment for Ukrainian independence came with the August 1991 hardliner 
coup in Moscow. Kravchuk issued a declaration of independence contingent on a referendum to 
be held in December 1991. In a simultaneous referendum on independence and a presidential 
election in December, Ukrainians supported independence at a rate of 90.3 % and elected 
Kravchuk as president. Kravchuk appealed to both communists and nationalist democrats as he 
opposed an economic shock reform similar to Russia and employed a civic, inclusive form of 
nationalism (Braumoeller 1997). Citizenship was offered to all people living in the Ukraine’s 
territory when the Nationality Act was passed in 1991. However, independence caused an 
executive and administrative void in the country. The parliament was the only Ukraine-based 
institution inherited by the Soviet Union. The office of the President was institutionalized 
through an annex to the 1978 Soviet Constitution. This resulted in a Parliament and a Presidency 
that were quite independent, none of which had the powers to dismiss the other. The 1994 
parliamentary elections led to a victory for a socialist-communist majority that gradually shifted 
in favor of both economic and political reform. Kravchuk was defeated by former Communist 
Leonid Kuchma in the 1994 presidential elections. This can be taken as a sign for the functioning 
of the democratic process, since the increasingly unpopular Kravchuk was replaced through 
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democratic means (Kravchuk 1999: 165). It was only in 1996 the Ukraine adopted a new 
constitution, being the last former Soviet republic to adopt a new constitution.  
The most important aspect about the Ukraine’s regime transitions is the fact that it was 
negotiated among moderates in the opposition and soft liners in the former elite. This certainly 
slowed down the process of democratization but avoided clashes among old and new political 
leaders. Kuzio calls this a “negotiated transition”, in which “counterelites and former ruling 
elites block out extremists on both sides” (Kuzio 1999: 11). Such, the Ukraine made very slow, 
but consistent and relatively smooth progress toward democracy. In addition, the pact among 
elites allowed for relative stability. Institutions remained largely unchanged over the first couple 
of years in independence. Stability and slow but steady progress might have been interpreted as 
positive signals by other foreign actors.  
 
Ukrainian Foreign Policy after 1991  
The Ukraine’s definition of its future relationship with Russia was the most crucial task 
in the first years after independence. In addition, the Ukraine had to define its position in the 
international system. Kravchuk pursued a policy that avoided alienating Russia but insisted on 
the Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence. The declaration of neutrality passed by the 
parliament in 1991 must be seen in this light, as it was mainly aimed to divert Moscow’s fear of 
a strong pro-Western and pro-NATO orientation of the Ukraine (Kuzio 2000). Cooperation with 
Russia, however, was based on very selective principles. For example, the Ukraine became a 
founding participant of the new established CIS, but only on the basis of its sovereignty. The 
Ukraine cooperated with Russia in energy matters (mainly because of its dependence on Russia 
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in this sector), but refused to join the CIS military bloc and the Belorussian-Russian union, 
referring to its neutral status (Chudowsky 2002: 27).   
The greatest conflict potential with Russia involved the status of the Crimea, a region 
mainly populated by Russians and transferred to the Ukraine only in 1954.22 After independence, 
the Ukrainian government secured the Crimea its status as an autonomous republic.23 
Nevertheless, Crimea declared its independence in 1992, enacted its own constitution and stated 
reunification with Russia as its goal. In 1994, Yuri Meshkov, the leader of the popular Crimean 
movement, was elected President and established his movement as the ruling political party 
(Kuzio and Meyer 1999: 300).24  This finally prompted the Ukrainian government to take action. 
Kuchma annulled the constitution and brought the region under direct control from Kiev.25 
Russia, however, did not intervene in this conflict given its engagement in Chechnya. 
Recognizing Crimean demands for independence would have stated a precedent for other regions 
such as Chechnya that were also struggling for independence.26   
Ukraine’s nuclear weapons involved a sensitive issue in which the country had to deal 
with the United States and Russia, as the United States favored the deployment of nuclear 
weapons in Russia only. Kravchuk used the country’s nuclear weapons as a means to put 
pressure on Russia and the West and demanded certain conditions for their removal. More than 
once, however, the Ukrainian parliament refused to sign agreements made between Kravchuk, 
Russia and the United States and forced him to continue negotiations. These long, protracted 
negotiations reflect confusion over foreign policy responsibilities in the years immediately 
independence, but also underline the willingness of both the legislature and the executive to 
resolve such conflicts on the bargaining table (D’Anieri 1999: 98).  After economic guarantees 
from the West and security guarantees from other nuclear powers were made, the parliament and 
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the president finally agreed to remove all its nuclear weapons in a tripartite statement with 
Russia and the United States in 1994 (Motyl and Krawchenko 1997: 261). This agreement 
improved the international status of the Ukraine and opened the door for Ukrainian membership 
in NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1995.27 Power considerations drove this development for 
both the Ukraine and NATO: For the Ukraine, membership involved important security 
guarantees against Russian interference; for NATO, it increased security through the extension 
of its sphere of influence to a strategically important region (Kuzio 2000a). The mere Ukrainian 
threat of full NATO membership, then, was enough to convince Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin 
to sign a treaty stating the inviolability of Ukraine’s borders in 1997.  
The Ukraine’s successful balancing in its relations with Russia and the West depended on 
several factors: First, the Ukraine’s slow progress toward democracy, coupled with a centrist 
government enjoying wide political support, increased its credibility in foreign policy issues. 
Kuzio argues that “pragmatic centrism is bad for the speed of its transition, but good in terms of 
maintaining stability and ethnic peace” (Kuzio 2000b: 161). Second, the Ukraine’s power status 
in relation to Russia and its strategic importance to the West allowed it to pursue policies such as 
PfP membership in NATO; options that were not available to other, weaker union republics. 
Third, the careful balancing of foreign policy preferences against Russia on one side and the 
West on the other side avoided alienation of these important international actors. Fourth, 
potential conflict in the Crimea was avoided by Russia’s entanglement in Chechnya, but also by 
the fact that the region shared a border only with the Ukraine.  
Relating regime change in the Ukraine to the findings on democratization and conflict, it 
seemingly contradicts the “dangerous democratization” hypothesis (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 
2002a, 2002b, Snyder 2000). Applying this argument to the Ukraine, one would expect that 
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movement toward democracy might have pushed the country into conflict with Russia. Yet, 
Ukraine’s transition towards democracy, combined with the stability of the transition through a 
pact between old and new elites, helped to prevent signaling misperceptions with Russia. The 
ability of parliament to challenge the president, as shown in its refusal to ratify agreements on 
the Black Sea fleet or nuclear disarmament, also reflects the functioning of the domestic 
institutional process. The slowness and smoothness of the Ukraine’s democratization allowed for 
the use of peaceful means to solve potential conflicts arising over the Crimea, its nuclear 
weapons and the Black Sea Fleet. In addition, this analysis also suggests a reconsideration of 
realist arguments. Ukraine’s nuclear weapons and naval force, plus its infantry and overall latent 
resources might have led to open conflict with Russia. Suprsingly, though, the Ukraine mitigated 
the impact of its power by transferring its nuclear weapons to Russia, the country that posed a 
great security threat for the Ukraine (D’Anieri 2002: 47). Accepting a decrease in power helped 
to defuse a possible conflict with Russia. 
 
 
Georgia 
Georgia was one of the most ethnically diverse republics of the former Soviet Union. 
According to the 1989 Soviet census, 70% of the 5.5 million population identified themselves as 
ethnically Georgian, 8% as Armenian, 6.3% as Russian, 5.7% Azeri and less than 3% as Ossetian 
or Abkhaz (Jones 1997: 506). In addition, these ethnic groups were largely geographically 
concentrated. During the Soviet period, Georgia experienced less intense russification than other 
republics. Under Stalin and Beria, both ethnically Georgian, Georgia enjoyed privileges not 
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awarded to other republics. A strong emphasis on national identity based on the Georgian 
language, alphabet and history of independence persisted through the whole Soviet period. For 
Russia, Georgia’s location in the Caucasus provided it with an important strategic forward 
defense against Turkey and Iran.  
 
Regime Transition 
Strong and organized independence movements existed in Georgia as early as the 1980s. 
The nationalist movements were heavily anti-Russian. The strength of these groups derived 
largely from Gorbachev’s politics of liberalization, allowing for the existence of national and 
regional non-Communist organizations that were soon openly used for a revival of Georgian 
language, culture and national identity (Cornell 1997: 158).  In addition, paramilitary groups 
supporting nationalist movements emerged.  
Much of the popular discontent that existed was aimed against the privileged status of the 
Abkhaz and Ossetian people in the two autonomous republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 
Abkhazia, Georgians “were increasingly upset by their lack of influence in policy-making and 
regional institutions as they actually formed a plurality, just short of a majority in the 
autonomous republic” (Cornell 1997: 160). In 1989, the Abkhaz leadership (supported by the 
South Ossetian republic) petitioned to Moscow for independence from Georgia. This, in turn, 
produced mass demonstrations by Georgians in the capital of Tbilisi that called for Georgia’s 
right to secede from the USSR. The Georgian Communist leadership dispersed the uprising with 
the use of military force, which discredited the party and destroyed its legitimacy among the 
population.  
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In the meantime, nationalist groups under the leadership of Zviad Gamsakhurdia prepared 
for the parliamentary elections in October 1990. Despite some democratic rhetoric, he focused 
his campaign almost entirely on the rights of Georgians in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Parties 
appearing only in one region of the country were prohibited from participating, thus virtually 
eliminating any minority representation.28 Gamsakhurdia’s movement, Round Table-Free 
Georgia, gained 54% of the vote, whereas the Communist Party received less than a third (Jones 
1997: 512). In May 1991, Gamsakhurdia was elected president with 87% of the vote (Snyder 
2000: 232). The new government proclaimed the Georgianization and Christianization of 
Georgia, which led to increasing tensions and violent clashes with Abkhaz and Ossetian 
minorities. Soon after the election, Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared their independence, a 
decision in turn annulled by Gamsakhurdia, who abolished the autonomous status of the two 
republics. Gamskhurdia completely underestimated the importance of a viable relationship with 
Russia.  The Ukraine, for example, made costly signals (e.g. liberal citizenship laws, blocking 
extremists from the policy making process) to assure its minorities, but also the prior homeland, 
of a continued commitment to protection of minorities. Georgia’s new government not just failed 
to do so, but even centered its policies on exclusionary nationalist principles that increasingly 
threatened its minorities.    
Gamsakhurdia in consequence seized dictatorial powers and suppressed any opposition, 
“labeling anyone who disagreed with him as a traitor of the country” (Cornell 1997: 168). 
Increasingly, his own supporters turned against him and by early 1992, the leaders of the two 
paramilitary groups overthrew Gamsakhurdia in a coup and invited former Soviet Union foreign 
minister Eduard Shevardnadze to overtake the government. A newly established shady 
institution, the State Council (led by the paramilitary groups), dissolved the parliament and 
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installed Shevardnadze as head of a new Consultative Council (Cornell 1997: 170). He was later 
confirmed as president in a popular election.  
Georgia’s first years after independence resulted in great internal instability and lack of 
any serious progress toward democracy. Georgia’s first elections were based on exclusionary 
principles against minority groups (in a country with 30% minority population) that were then 
institutionalized in the new government.29 These developments increased concerns in Moscow. 
 
Violent Conflict in Abkhazia  
The authoritarian, nationalist policies of Gamsakhurdia’s government led to considerable 
fear among minority groups. Linz and Stepan note that this “eroded a core component of future 
democratization – full citizenship rights for all inhabitants regardless of ethnicity” (Linz and 
Stepan 1996: 383). In addition, the government’s hostile attitude towards Russia and the former 
Communist Party alarmed Moscow. Gamsakhurdia also misjudged Moscow’s strong strategic 
interest in the Caucasus. His opposition to joining the CIS increased Moscow’s interest in his 
defeat. Gamsakhurdia’s successor Shevardnadze was only slightly more successful in stabilizing 
the country and avoiding violent conflict. Especially, his power was very limited as he faced 
paramilitary groups assuming more and more power (Jones 1997: 527).  
In June 1992, the Abkhazian government sent a draft treaty to Tbilisi that would have 
guaranteed Georgia’s integrity. Georgia rejected this draft and Tengiz Kitovani, leader of one of 
the major paramilitary formations, initiated military action against Abkhazia in August 1992. 
This happened without Shevardnadze’s approval, but finally prompted Moscow to intervene in 
the conflict. An agreement signed by Yeltsin, Shevardnadze and the Abkhaz president, however, 
turned out to be abortive premature and exemplified Shevardnadze’s fragile position, since 
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Kitovani simply refused to acknowledge it (Cornell 1997:171). In the meantime, Russia greatly 
increased military support for the Abkhaz forces. An additional factor influencing Russia’s 
actions was Shevardnadze’s unpopularity in the Russian military.  They saw him as the main 
architect of Russia’s dismantlement (Hunter 1994: 131). Ongoing fighting in Abkhazia led to the 
dislodgement of about 200,000 Georgians from the region (Cornell 1997: 175). After the defeat 
of the Georgian troops in late 1993, Russia established a cease-fire under CIS peacekeeping 
observation. However, this peacekeeping mission was in fact Russian-only and included 
battalions that had previously fought in the conflict on the Abkhaz side. Since then, large-scale 
military fighting has ended with Abkhazia enjoying de-facto independence under Russian 
protection.  
Georgia’s inability to define a position regarding its minorities that was acceptable to 
Russia, and that finally led to Russian military intervention was caused by several factors. First, 
strong nationalist tendencies and the complete popular discredit for the old Communist elite led 
to the election of an openly nationalist, authoritarian president. Newspapers and television were 
soon under government control, and although a “Rechtsstaat” existed on paper by 1991, laws 
“were flawed by omission or vagueness, and betrayed a continuing concern for tight regulation 
by government” (Jones 1997: 515). Gamsakhurdia’s exclusionary nationalism and attacks toward 
ethnic minorities alienated Russia and finally prompted Moscow to intervene in Abkhazia. 
Second, the geographical proximity of northern Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) to other 
very conflictual regions in the North Caucasus on Russian territory significantly enhanced 
Moscow’s interest to contain the further destabilization of the region and avoid spillover effects 
(Cornell 1997: 344). Third, dissimilar preferences between Georgia and Russia (as well as the 
old elite) exacerbated tensions and made a viable foreign policy that was acceptable for both 
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sides impossible. The violent dissolution of protests in 1989 fundamentally discredited the old 
elite and made pact agreements such as in the Ukraine unfeasible. Fourth, Georgia 
underestimated the strategic interest of Russia in the Caucasus. Its weak power status in 
comparison to Russia led to the humiliating military defeat in 1993.  
I argue that the great amount of instability involving Georgia’s transition lowered its 
ability to credibly signal its foreign policy preferences. Leadership struggles, domestic unrest and 
nationalist tendencies led to great concern among Russia and the West. The threat posed to 
minorities by the government made a viable relationship with Russia impossible. Since stability 
in Russia was considered the main concern by the West (especially the United States) in the first 
years after independence, it decreased Georgia’s chances of recognition and support (Cornell 
1997: 367). This interpretation is consistent with evidence suggested by Gleditsch and Ward 
(1998), showing that democratic reversals and instability increase conflict propensities. This also 
conforms with a signaling argument, suggesting that polities with unstable and fragile domestic 
institutions lack the signaling ability of stable democracies (Fearon 1994). In addition, the 
proximity of unrest in Georgia’s regions to unstable zones in the Northern Caucasus increased 
Russian incentives for intervention.  
 
Although the evidence presented above is admittedly anecdotal, I argue that a focus on 
the nature of a regime transition offers some important insights.  Comparing regime change in 
the Ukraine and Georgia, I suggest that the slow, retarded transition in the Ukraine explains the 
peacefulness of its foreign policy behavior at least in part. Although negotiated transitions will 
necessarily slow the process of renewal and democratization, they have the advantage that old, 
but still powerful elites are not threatened in their position (Kuzio 2000b).  The contempt of the 
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ancient regime by the new Georgian elite, however, estranged Russia as the former imperial 
center. This, together with the authoritarian Georgian government’s failure to guarantee 
participation for all of its population led to Russian military intervention (Cornell 1997). An 
explanation focusing on the speed and volatility as well as the direction of a regime transition 
explains the seemingly puzzling fact that both the Ukraine and Georgia had geographically 
concentrated ethnic minorities but nevertheless experienced different foreign policy outcomes. 
Slow, smooth democratization decreases the probability of violent conflict, whereas rapid 
change, coupled with threats against old elites increases the perils of conflict. In the following 
section, I further  develop the causal connections between regime transition and inter-state 
conflict. 
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Theoretical Expectations 
Evidence indicates that democratic polities initiate conflict at lower rates than non-
democratic states, and almost never initiate against other democracies. However, the process of 
democratic transition remains obscure. That is, the evidence tying democracy to non-violent 
conflict resolution largely assumes that polity type remains fixed over time. Transitioning states 
are not excluded from models of democratic peace, but the regime changes occurring over time 
do not get modeled separately. This is not true of democratization and war models (see for 
example Gleditsch and Ward 1998, 2000, Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002a, 2002b), but to date 
models of transition and conflict remain underspecified and theoretically underdeveloped. I first 
examine how normative or institutional explanations of the democratic peace could be applied to 
transitioning states. Hypothesizing a linear relationship between democracy levels and conflict, it 
might be argued that increasing constraints and deepening norms affect states moving toward 
democracy. I then identify weaknesses in this argument based on existing empirical evidence 
indicating that incomplete democratization (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002a, 2002b) or 
“rocky” transitions (Gleditsch and War 1998, 2000) increase conflict likelihood. In the second 
section, I argue that a signaling approach gives account for both decreased conflict propensities 
of smoothly democratizing states as well as increased conflict propensities for states undergoing 
highly volatile transitions. A concluding section will translate these arguments into hypotheses. 
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Research on the democratic peace indicates that democracies engage in less conflict than 
autocracies, at least with similarly democratic states. It is not clear how these findings relate to 
the democratization process. Applying existing theoretical accounts of the democratic peace to 
transitioning states, one would expect that democratizing states are less conflict prone than 
autocratizing ones. Normative or institutional approaches can easily be translated to 
democratizing states: Due to increasing constraints and deepening norms, countries moving 
toward democracy are expected to less often use violent coercion. Such an extension of existing 
theories sees democratization as a linear process, where increases in democracy levels linearly 
translate into reduced conflict likelihood. 
The extension of normative and institutional theories to democratizing states suffers from 
several weaknesses. First, empirical evidence does not support the view of democratization as 
linear, gradual processes. If attempts toward democracy are reversed or if change comes arrives 
too quickly, the likelihood of conflictual behavior increases (Gleditsch and Ward 1998, 2000, 
Mansfield and Snyder 1995). As shown by Lichbach (1984), the majority of transitions do not 
proceed in a gradual, linear manner. In addition, evidence suggests that transitions to democracy 
that are not yet completed have increased conflict propensities (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 
2002a, 2002b). Hence, democratization would be more of a threshold process. Democracies tend 
to be more peaceful only when a certain set of institutions and/or norms are present. Yet, if the 
democratic peace is valid only for democracies that reached a certain threshold of stability, how 
can this threshold be defined or measured? Setting thresholds is somehow arbitrary, and 
furthermore does not explain theoretically how much democracy is enough to avoid the perils of 
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conflict.30 In addition, evidence brought forward by proponents of the dangerous democratization 
argument does not look at the specific nature of the transition process; it neglects speed or 
volatility as a factor (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002a, 2002b).  
Second, regime change itself, given the uncertainty and instability that denotes these 
processes, may indeed increase conflict propensities. Institutional weaknesses and the lack of 
deepened, liberal norms (combined with rising levels of mass participation) in unconsolidated 
democracies may lead threatened elites to appeal to nationalism and in turn resort to violence 
(Snyder 2000). High degrees of uncertainty and instability might invite diversionary moves by 
leaders in transitioning states. Also, transitioning states might function as likely targets for 
neighboring states. Therefore, countries undergoing incomplete transitions to democracy or 
autocracy may have increased conflict probabilities.  
 Signaling models (Fearon 1994, Eyerman and Hart 1996, Partell and Palmer 1999, 
Schultz 2001, Prins 2003) emphasize the importance of regime type in situations of crisis 
bargaining. States that incur audience costs when entering international disputes are expected to 
have superior abilities to demonstrate resolve and send credible signals. Since elites in 
democratic countries are accountable to the public, and foreign policy failure might lead to 
removal from office, it is a costly signal when they initiate or escalate international disputes. 
These signals provide important information to the opponent and reduce uncertainty in crisis 
situations. Empirical applications of Fearon’s model (Fearon 1994) have indeed shown support 
for the ability of democratic states to credibly signal their foreign policy preferences in crisis 
situations (Eyerman and Hart 1996, Partell and Palmer 1999, Schultz 2001, Prins 2003). Thus, 
peace between democracies may not so much depend on norms or constraints, but their ability to 
make credible commitments.  
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Applying this logic to transitioning states, it suggests that the conflict probability of states 
undergoing regime changes depends on the effect of the transition on their signaling abilities. 
Countries moving slowly and smoothly toward democracy might have similar signaling abilities 
as consolidated democracies. Institutional reform and expansion of the electorate that comes over 
in a measured manner is expected to enhance the credibility of signals sent by political elites in 
democratizing states. States that experience highly volatile transition processes, however, will 
not be able to credibly signal their foreign policy preferences. Democratic reversals greatly 
increase the uncertainty about a state’s preferences. Thus, countries sliding back and forth 
between democracy and autocracy are less efficient in sending credible signals and security 
concerns among contiguous states may increase. This is consistent with evidence showing that 
states with unstable or transitional political competition are more likely to reciprocate in 
interstate militarized disputes and, in addition, are more likely to engage in escalatory behavior 
(Prins 2003). 
Normative, institutional and signaling approaches provide different explanations for the 
peaceful behavior of democratic states. Empirical research, however, often lacks measurement 
that allows for precise differentiation between these theoretical accounts, since most of the 
research uses the same data. Simply measuring the level of democracy or polity type does not tell 
us whether norms, constraints or signaling are responsible for a change in foreign policy 
behavior.31 Applying arguments drawing on norms and constraints versus signaling explanations 
to transitioning states, however, suggest different expectations for the foreign policy behavior of 
democratizing states.  
First, a signaling model anticipates that high variance in democracy levels increases a 
state’s conflict propensities. Democratic reversals increase uncertainty about a country’s 
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preferences and makes signals less reliable since a stable democratic opposition is absent at the 
domestic level. A normative or institutional argument, however, does not address the conflict 
behavior of unevenly democratizing states. Consequently, I expect that highly volatile, uneven 
transitions increase the likelihood of violent conflict. Second, both signaling and normative/ 
institutional approaches suggest decreased conflict propensities for states moving smoothly and 
steadily toward democracy. Deepening democracy results in increased decisional constraints on 
elites and strengthens the development of democratic norms. In consequence, this will foster 
progress toward real opposition parties and contested, competitive elections, and enhance 
signaling abilities. Therefore, I expect that smooth, moderate change toward democracy 
reduces a country’s conflict propensities.32 Finally, the current level of democracy is included 
in the model to look at the impact of present regime type on conflict likelihood. Consistent with 
the democratic peace findings, stable democracies are expected to have decreased conflict 
probabilities.  
In addition, I emphasize the importance of controlling for other factors that increase 
conflict likelihood but that are not directly related to the transition process. Power is a strong and 
potent predictor of conflict (see Geller and Singer 1998 for a review). Hence, I hypothesize that 
the higher a state’s national capabilities, the greater the likelihood of conflict involvement. 
Besides, evidence shows that the number of border shared is positively related to a state’s 
conflict propensities (Vasquez 1993, 1995, 2000). This suggests that as the number of borders 
increases, conflict becomes more likely. Additionally, research has shown that states having a 
high degree of preference similarity with each other are less conflict prone than states that have 
antagonistic preferences (Kim 1991, 1992, 1996, Rousseau et al. 1996). At the monadic level, 
this is measured as the preference similarity with the leader of the international system. It is 
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hypothesized that satisfaction with the international status quo decreases conflict 
propensities.  
Lastly, regime change might alter the impact of power, contiguity or preference similarity 
on conflict likelihood. The impact of conflict variables is hypothesized to be significantly altered 
for transitioning states. This scrutinizes the stability assumption made by the conflict literature. 
Especially, I hypothesize that the impact of power and contiguity on conflict likelihood is 
decreased for democratizing states.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Uneven or “rocky” transitions increase conflict likelihood. 
Hypothesis 2: Smooth change toward democracy decreases conflict propensities. 
Hypothesis 3: Stable democracies are less conflict prone than anocracies or autocracies. 
Hypothesis 4: More powerful states are more likely to experience violent conflict. 
Hypothesis 5: A high number of borders increases conflict probability. 
Hypothesis 6: States satisfied with the international status quo are less likely to engage in   
violent interstate conflict.  
Hypothesis 7: The effect of power on conflict likelihood is lower for democratizing states than 
for other states. 
Hypothesis 8: The impact of contiguity on conflict probability is decreased for democratizing 
states.  
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Research Design  
Data and Methodology 
The analysis covers the period from 1950 to 2000 and includes all countries that are 
members of the state system as defined in the Correlates of War data.33 Pooled cross-sectional 
time-series (TSCS) data are well suited to study the dynamics of change over time in different 
units. However, the assumption of homogeneity of data across units and time are easily violated 
in this kind of data (Sayrs 1989). A fixed effects model is one method to account for these 
temporal and spatial differences (Green, Kim and Yoon 2001). Applying a fixed effects model, 
the intercept varies from unit to unit, but remains time invariant across individual units. This 
technique recognizes the non-constant variation through the introduction of different intercept 
dummy variables for each cross-sectional unit. It models fixed unobserved differences in the data 
by including unmeasured predictors of the dependent variable that cause each unit to have its 
own base rate, or intercept. 
However, as Beck and Katz (2001) point out, the fixed effects model has pernicious 
consequences when applied to time-series cross-section data with a binary dependent variable. 
Especially when dealing with rare events data (such as international conflict, where the majority 
of cases takes a value of 0), the application of fixed effects hides the explanatory power of the 
independent variables except for the fixed effect dummy variables (Beck and Katz 2001: 489). 34 
A general estimating equation (GEE) can address the problems of pooled TSCS data and the 
model gives substantial flexibility in specifying the correlation structure within pools (Zorn 
2001). GEE differs significantly from the fixed effects model as it does not model individual, 
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unit-specific effects, but corrects for intra-cluster correlation “by adjusting the covariance matrix 
of the estimated parameters to account for non-independence across observations or time points” 
(Zorn 2001, 474).35 The population-averaged coefficient represents the average effect of a one 
unit shift in the independent variables on the whole population. Thus, GEE models are 
appropriate for cases in which one wants to assess general propensities across units. As this study 
intends to explain the overall impact of regime changes on states’ conflict propensities and not 
the propensity of one or several states, a GEE model is appropriate to deal with spatial and 
temporal dependence. The within-group temporal correlation is specified with a first-order 
autoregressive correlation structure (AR 1).  
Data for this analysis come from various sources. The initial dataset was generated using 
the software EUgene that covers the period from 1950 to1992 (Bennett and Stam 2000).36 Data 
for militarized interstate disputes (MID) have been updated until 2000 using the Correlates of 
War 2 MID 3.1 dataset.37 The data for democracy and autocracy scores are derived from the 
Polity IV dataset.38 Data on national capabilities come from the COW 2 data (Singer et al. 1972, 
Singer 1987) using the 3.0 update. A measure for similarity of foreign policy positions is 
provided in EUgene.  Contiguity data come from COW and measure the total number of states 
bordering by land and 400 miles of open water (Stinnett et al 2002). The analysis is conducted at 
the monadic level. Such, the unit of analysis is the nation-state in a given year. I use a 
generalized estimation equation model that allows for correction of spatial and temporal 
dependence, as well as logistic and poisson specifications, depending on the form of the 
dependent variable. Logit and poisson techniques are designed for probability models and are 
extensions of the linear regression model for ordinal and binary dependent variables.  
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Dependent Variables  
The dependent variable in this analysis is militarized interstate disputes (Gosh and Palmer 
2003).39 I use two different operationalizations of conflict.40 First, I use onset of militarized 
interstates disputes (MID) as defined by the Correlates of War project. This variable takes a 
value of either 0 or 1, a value of 1 indicating that a MID occurred in a country-year. Second, the 
number of MIDs per country-year is taken as the dependent variable. This grasps the total 
number of events occurring and does not simplify it in a binary way. Theoretically, a count 
model better is a better way to operationalize the dependent variable MID. Through 
dichotomizing, we necessarily loose information, although empirically the amount of 
information loss may not be large and thus may not affect the results. Empirically, this variable 
takes values between 0 and 26.41  
 
Independent Variables 
Regime Change Variables 
 For regime change, I rely heavily on earlier work by Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000).42 
I test for the impact of regime change on MIDs and the number of MIDs occurring per country-
year. Four separate regime change variables are constructed using Polity IV data (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2002). The first variable measures magnitude and direction of change in democracy level 
over the past ten years. 43 The combined democracy-autocracy score is used to calculate this 
change variable.44 Democracy-autocracy scores for the current year are calculated by subtracting 
autocracy scale values from democracy scale values, as such returning values between –10 and 
10. I take each current democracy-autocracy score and subtract the score of ten years before from 
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the current value. This returns empirical values from –17 to 19.45 This corresponds to the overall 
change variable used by Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000). 
Second, I use the above mentioned variable to calculate whether a country’s change in 
democracy level was directed toward autocracy or democracy. This variable measures direction 
of change only. The total change values (ranging from –19 to 19) are transformed into a 
trichotomous measure. The variable equals –1 for all negative values meaning autocratization, 0 
for no change and 1 for all positive values indicating change toward democracy. 
Third, I transform the first variable (magnitude and direction of change) into absolute 
values. I transform all negative values into positive ones to grasp the absolute amount of change 
in a given period, regardless of whether the change was toward democracy or autocracy. The 
variable ranges from 0 to 19 in this sample. Not transforming negative values of change would 
mean that the variable would measure magnitude and direction of change. As I include another 
variable measuring the direction of change, not transforming this variable results in including 
two variables in one model that both measure direction.46  This is an improvement of Gleditsch 
and Ward (1998, 2000) as they do not transform negative values, but nevertheless include a 
variable measuring change and direction, and direction separately in one model. The 
operationalization used by Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) might also explain why the authors 
receive a negative value for the variable measuring magnitude and direction together (suggesting 
that democratization decreases the risk of war), but a positive value for the direction of change 
variable (contradicting the former result). Breaking apart magnitude and direction of change 
avoids multicollinearity and allows for better assessing the separate impact of the two component 
parts.  
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The fourth variable measures the variation in democracy-autocracy scores. This variable 
accounts for the variance of change. I calculate the variance in democracy-autocracy scores for 
each country over the past ten years. In this sample, the variable ranges from 0 to 78. Countries 
that are sliding back and forth between democratization and autocratization are hypothesized to 
have higher conflict propensities.  
Finally, the current democracy-autocracy score (ranging from –10 to 10) for each 
country-year is included in the model. Since this research aims to extend the findings of the 
democratic peace to democratizing states, it is important to control for current polity scores. This 
variable is used with a one year lag.  
 
Conflict Variables 
The inclusion of several variables that are related to conflict aims to build a better 
specified model. First, power is a strong predictor of conflict behavior. A state’s power is 
measured using the Correlates of War CINC score, which is the combined index of national  
capabilities.47 Second, the more neighbors a state has, the greater the level of inter-state conflict.  
 
This variable counts the number of neighbor-states for each system member. Data come from the 
Correlates of War contiguity data (Stinnett et al. 2002). Third, satisfaction with the international 
status quo may have an impact on its peacefulness. Signorino and Ritter (1999) develop a 
variable measuring the similarity of foreign policy positions S for each state with the system 
leader. The values for S range from –1 to 1. A value of 1 indicates identical policy positions, 
whereas –1 indicates that the two states are as far apart as possible in the policy space. For the 
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time period under analysis, the system leader is the United States, thus having a value of 1. This 
variable is available in EUgene, but only up to 1992.  
 
 
Interaction Variables 
Standard interaction effects are a way to deal with the interactive relationship among 
explanatory variables and their combined effect on conflict.48 I focus my tests on effects between 
regime change variables and conflict variables and the combined impact on conflict. I test for the 
combined effect of capabilities and democratization by multiplying the two variables. Does 
democratization reduce the impact of capabilities for conflict? Then, mutually reinforcing effects 
of contiguity and democratic change are examined through multiplying the variables. Is the 
number of borders related to more or less conflict for states that are undergoing changes toward 
democracy?  
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Data Analysis 
The Logit Model 
I employ a general estimating equation with a logit link function to model MID onset (a 
dichotomous variable). The logit coefficient represents the effect of an increase in the 
independent variable on the log odds of an increase or decrease in the dependent variable. I 
specify the correlation matrix as a first-order autoregressive process.  
 
Direct Effects 
The first set of models looks at direct effects of regime change and conflict variables on 
MID onset. In the first model, I include the combined magnitude and direction variable and the 
trichotomous direction variable. This specification is presented to facilitate comparison to the 
models used by Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) since it employs the same regime change 
variables.49 However, I expect that this model specification will render one of the change toward 
democracy variables insignificant since they both measure direction and are highly collinear. 
Using militarized interstate disputes as the dependent variable, the functional form can be written 
as follows:  
it
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The second model excludes the direction variable to test whether my expectation that the overall 
change and the direction model should not be included in one model is right.  
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The third model breaks magnitude and direction of change apart and includes the variables 
measuring absolute change and direction of change. 
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TABLE 1: Logistic Regression Estimates for Probability of Militarized Interstate Disputes 1950-2000 
 
Variable 
 
Logit Model 1 
 
Logit Model 2 
 
 
Logit Model 3 
 
Marginal 
Effects Model 2 
 
Marginal       
Effects Model 3 
Magnitude and 
Direction of 
Change 
combined 
-0.002 
(0.024) 
-0.0352** 
(0.017) 
― -0.25 ― 
Direction of 
Change 
-0.292*** 
(0.144) 
― -0.315*** 
(0.106) 
― -0.13 
Absolute 
Change 
― ― -0.082*** 
 (0.031) 
― -0.30 
Variance 0.0075 
(0.006) 
0.0079 
(0.0065) 
0.028*** 
(0.009) 
― +0.49 
Polity Score, 
lagged 
-.0119 
(0.0096) 
- 0.012 
(0.0096) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
― ― 
Preference 
similarity 
-0.572 
(0.435) 
- 0.665 
(0.436) 
-0.549 
(0.426) 
― ― 
Capabilities 26.112*** 
4.244 
26.474*** 
(4.345) 
25.951*** 
(4.120) 
+0.76 +0.77 
Contiguity 0.100*** 
(0.023) 
0.099*** 
(0.0233) 
0.097*** 
(0.023) 
+0.58 +0.52 
Constant 
 
-1.484*** 
(0.270) 
-1.435*** 
(0.271) 
- 1.436*** 
(0.265) 
― ― 
N=2410 
Note: Coefficients are estimated using a generalized estimating equation with a logit link function and an AR 1 
specification of the correlation matrix. Standard errors are in parentheses. Column four and five represent the change 
in the probability that Y=1, fluctuating the significant variables from their minimum to their maximum one at a time, 
while holding all other variables at mean values.  
*** p < .01  
 **  p < .05  
 
The first model includes two variables that measure change toward democracy and comes 
closest to the variable operationalization used in Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000). As expected, 
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one of the democratization variables is significant and negative, whereas the other one is 
insignificant. The trichotomous measure indicates that change toward democracy decreases 
conflict likelihood, whereas the overall change variable (ranging from –17 to 19) does not have a 
significant impact on conflict likelihood. This is due to a multicollinearity problem between the 
variables, since both measure direction of change. Expressed in probabilities, change toward 
democracy decreases the likelihood of conflict by 11.7%, holding all other variables at their 
mean. This supports the hypothesis that states changing smoothly towards democracy are better 
able to signal their foreign policy preferences than autocratizing ones. Variance of change is 
insignificant in the first model. Thus, the hypothesis expecting that rocky transitions are more 
conflict prone is not supported. This result is consistent with earlier findings on the relationship 
between variance and conflict probability that failed to find a relationship between variance and 
conflict onset (Gleditsch and Ward 2000).50  
In addition, the impact of current polity scores and preference similarity on conflict 
propensities is not statistically different from zero. This contradicts my expectation that the 
democratic peace is found at the monadic level as well. The finding for current level of 
democracy also reduces the validity of my theoretical argument. I argued that signaling models 
offer a fitting explanation for democratizing countries as an extension of the findings for stable 
democracies. Yet, the results do not indicate decreased conflict propensities for stable, 
consolidated democracies. In contrast, it indicates support for earlier studies that failed to show a 
linear relationship between democracy level and conflict at the monadic level (see for example 
Rousseau et al. 1996, Gleditsch and Hegre 1997, Gleditsch and Ward 1998). However, it might 
be that the relationship is non-linear which is not tested for in this model.  
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The result for preference similarity might be a function of the monadic level of analysis. 
It will matter more how close a state is to an opponent than to the system leader. One might 
expect that the greater the distance between two states in their preferences with the system 
leader, the more likely conflict is. I also suggest that this measure does not consider preference 
similarity with a regional power. In addition, the United States as the system leader scored a one 
for preference similarity, but was involved in a high number of conflicts. It might be naïve to 
assume that the system leader is satisfied with the international status quo.51 Contiguity and 
power strongly increase the probability of conflict likelihood as expected by the hypotheses.  
The second model excludes the trichotomous measure for direction of change. As 
predicted, the magnitude and direction variable now becomes significant. Varying change to 
democracy from its minimum to its maximum results in a 25% decrease in the likelihood of MID 
occurrence, holding everything else constant. States moving towards greater democracy are 
significantly less likely to engage in violent interstate conflict. Thus, explanations put forward by 
democratic peace theorists regarding the peacefulness of stable democracies seem to be present 
in democratizing states.  
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Figure 1: Effect of Democratization on Conflict
 
Figure one depicts the relationship between change toward democracy and conflict.52 
Countries experiencing high change toward autocracy have a conflict probability greater than 
40%. In contrast, conflict likelihood decreases to less than 20% for highly democratizing states. 
Since the confidence intervals at the tails are relatively wide, I vary the variable from one 
standard deviation below its mean to one above, which still results in a 7% decrease of conflict 
likelihood for democratizing states. This finding contrasts in part with evidence presented by 
Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 2002a, 2002b), which indicates higher conflict probabilities for 
incomplete transitions to democracy. Although this research does not directly test the impact of 
regime change toward an unstable democracy, it is still puzzling that general change toward 
democracy decreases conflict likelihood, whereas Mansfield and Snyder (2002a, 2002b) find that 
incomplete democratization increases conflict proneness. It seems that smooth transitions to 
democracy gradually alter a state’s foreign policy. As democracy deepens and strengthens, 
conflict proneness also decreases.  In contrast, Mansfield and Snyder’s (1995, 2002a, 2002b) 
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findings suggest that up to a certain threshold, countries moving toward democracy are more 
conflict prone than others. Thus, until enough time has passed to establish stable institutions 
“guaranteeing the rule of law, civil rights, a free and effective press, and representative 
government” change toward democracy increases conflict likelihood (Mansfield and Snyder 
2002b: 530). It is not clear yet how these divergent findings might be reconciled.  
Variance of change, current polity score and preference are insignificant as in the first 
model specification. Power strongly predicts the likelihood of MID occurrence. Varying 
capabilities from its minimum to its maximum and setting all other variables at their means, the 
likelihood of conflict goes up by 76%. This supports earlier research finding a strong and 
positive relationship between power and conflict likelihood (Bremer 1980, Geller and Singer 
1998). Equally, a higher number of borders results in increased conflict probabilities. Conflict 
likelihood goes up by 58% if contiguity is varied for its full range (and all other variables are 
held at their means). As an example, the model predicts a 96% probability that China will be 
involved in MID in 1991, being contiguous with 18 states (and given the values of other 
variables) and indeed, China was involved in a MID during 1991. The positive relationship 
between number of borders and conflict confirms other research pointing to the impact of 
territory on conflict (Vasquez 1992, 1995, 2000).  
The third model presented in table one breaks magnitude and direction of change apart. 
Direction of change (ranging from –1 to 1) is negatively related to conflict likelihood, which is 
consistent with the other model specifications. The coefficient for the variable measuring 
direction of change is negative and significant, supporting the expectation that democratization 
decreases the likelihood of MID occurrence. Interestingly, variance becomes significant in this 
model. High variance in polity scores increases the probabilities of MID onset. Holding 
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everything else constant, conflict probabilities increase by 49% when variance goes from its 
minimum to its maximum.  
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Figure 2: Effect of Variance on Conflict
  
Figure two shows that the degree of volatility of a transition positively impacts conflict 
propensities. Not controlling for variance would suggest that change toward democracy simply 
translates into more peacefulness.  This finding corresponds to Gleditsch and Ward (1998), yet 
caution is necessary since it is not consistent over different model specifications. Interestingly, 
absolute change in polity scores is negatively related to conflict in model three. This suggests 
that regime change itself, irregardless of its direction, reduces conflict propensities. Stable states 
might thus be more conflict prone than transitioning ones.  Some caution is needed in 
interpreting this result. Tests of multicollinearity showed that the variance and absolute change 
variable are closely related. The negative relationship between absolute change and conflict 
might thus be a product of the high correlation with variance. The results for other variables are 
similar to the other model specifications. Current level of democracy and preference similarity 
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are not significant. Power is by far the most potent predictor in this analysis. Varying national 
capabilities for its full range, conflict likelihood increases by 77%. Ranging contiguity from its 
minimum to its maximum, conflict propensities go up by 52%. The results for power and 
contiguity are very robust over all model specifications.    
  
Interactive Effects 
The next set of models includes the interaction terms between change toward democracy 
variables and power and contiguity, respectively. I run all of them in separate models since I 
interact the same independent variables in various combinations to avoid problems of 
multicollinearity. 
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TABLE 2: Logistic Regression Estimates for Probability of Militarized Interstate Disputes 1950-2000, 
Interaction Effects 
 
Variable 
 
 
Interaction  
Model 1 
 
Interaction 
Model 2 
 
Interaction  
Model 3 
 
Interaction 
Model 4 
Magnitude and 
Direction of 
Change 
-0.0477*** 
 (0.017) 
- 0.040** 
(0.0171) 
― ― 
Direction of 
Change 
―  ― -0.348*** 
(0.104) 
 -0.326*** 
 (0.104) 
Absolute Change ―  ― -0.081*** 
 (0.0308) 
-0.0828*** 
(0.0308) 
Variance 0.0096 
(0.006) 
0.0085 
(0.0063) 
 0.027*** 
(0.009) 
0.028*** 
(0.0096) 
Polity Score, 
lagged 
-0.0129 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
 -0.015 
(0.009) 
-0.013 
(0.0089) 
Preference 
similarity 
-0.658 
(0.412) 
-0.643 
(0.4203) 
-0.555 
(0.412) 
-0.535 
(0.415) 
Capabilitiesa 28.783***   
(4.392)   
26.816*** 
(4.197) 
28.920*** 
(4.514) 
26.204*** 
(3.939) 
Contiguitya 0.1024***   
(0.0221) 
0.1021*** 
(0.0226) 
 0.097*** 
 (0.0219) 
 0.098*** 
(0.022) 
Magnitude and 
Direction 
*Capabilities 
-3.3517***   
(1.129) 
  ― ― ― 
Magnitude and 
Direction 
*Contiguity 
― -0.0106** 
(0.0054) 
― ― 
Direction 
*Capabilities 
   ―   ―  -17.136*** 
(6.170) 
  ― 
Direction 
*Contiguity 
   ―   ―   ― -0.073** 
(0.0366) 
Constant 
 
-1.247***   
(0.261) 
-0.8912*** 
(0.224) 
-1.226*** 
(0.261) 
 -1.448*** 
(0.258) 
N=2410 
Note: Coefficients are estimated using generalized estimating equation with a logit link function and an AR 1 
specification of the correlation matrix. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
a Mean centered values of capabilities and contiguity are used for the interaction terms. 
*** p < .01  
**  p < .05  
 
The interaction terms provide some new insight in the conflict behavior of transitioning 
states.53 All of the interaction terms are negative and significant, indicating a strong moderating 
effect of the transition variables on factors known as strong predictors of conflict likelihood. The 
first model includes an interaction term between magnitude and direction of change and 
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capabilities. The coefficient for the interaction variable is negative and statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. The second model includes an interaction between change toward democracy and 
contiguity. The interaction is negative and significant, indicating that democratization decreases 
the impact of contiguity on conflict onset. The third and fourth model include interactions 
between the trichotomous change variable and power and contiguity, respectively. Both 
interaction terms are negative and significant and thus confirm the robustness of results over 
different models. Since continuous interaction terms are difficult to interpret by looking at the 
coefficients, I include graphical displays of the interaction variables in the first and second model 
presented in table two.  
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Figure 3: Moderating Effect of Magnitude and
 
Figure three shows that the impact of capabilities on conflict changes greatly if states are 
in regime transition. The magnitude and direction of change variable is set at one standard 
deviation below its mean (change toward autocracy), zero for no change (which is close to its 
mean) and one standard deviation above its mean (change toward democracy). Autocratizing 
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states with high capabilities have the greatest likelihood to experience conflict. The effect of 
capabilities on conflict is much lower for countries changing toward democracy. The curve for 
democratizing countries is rather flat compared to stable countries and autocratizing countries. 
Thus, democratization greatly decreases the otherwise strong impact of power on conflict. The 
altered effect of power on conflict propensities for states undergoing regime transitions suggests 
future consideration in conflict models.   
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Figure 4: Moderating Effect of Magnitude and
 
This figure represents the moderating impact of change toward democracy on contiguity 
as in the second interaction model. Again, the change toward democracy variables is set at one 
standard deviation below and above its mean for autocratization and democratization 
respectively, and set at zero for stable states. Figure four shows that the impact of contiguity 
changes for transitioning states, although the effect is much weaker than for the interaction with 
capabilities. States that are democratizing have significantly lower conflict probabilities even if 
bordered by a high number of states. Democratic states are 7% less likely than autocratizing ones 
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to be involved in a MID for the states having the highest numbers of borders. This suggests that 
the moderating effect of democratization on the number of borders is relatively small. The 
probability of conflict increases from below 20% to more than 30% for a change from 0 to 10 
borders for democratizing states. For autocratizing states, this probability increases from 25% to 
almost 40% of conflict likelihood given a change in borders from 0 to 10. The probability of 
conflict, however, increases in similar ways for transitioning states and stable states for the range 
of contiguity. A better measure might look at the number of democratic versus non-democratic 
neighbors. The impact of contiguity on conflict might be sufficiently lower for democratizing 
states in largely democratic environments.  
To summarize, the findings of the logit models support earlier research that showed a 
negative relationship between change toward democracy and conflict (Gleditsch and Ward 1998, 
2000). In addition, it explains the contradictory findings of Gleditsch and Ward (1998) for 
change toward democracy. If multicollinearity is avoided, change toward democracy 
significantly decreases conflict likelihood which is consistent over all model specifications. 
Findings for variance are mixed. However, earlier evidence failed to find a consistent 
relationship between variance of change and conflict onset (Gleditsch and Ward 2000). The 
moderating effects of democratization on power and contiguity are consistent in all models and 
indicate a negative effect of change toward democracy on power and contiguity. I will now test 
the hypotheses employing a poisson model, which models the distribution of the dependent 
variable in a more precise way.  
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The Poisson Model 
A poisson regression model is employed to estimate the number of conflicts occurring per 
country year.54 MIDs are rare events and the distribution of the data does appear to follow a 
poisson distribution.55 The poisson coefficient allows calculating the probability of an increase or 
decrease in the number of events occurring. Once again, a GEE estimator is used to effectively 
model the possible correlational structure of the data. A first-order autoregressive component is 
specified. Similar to Tables 1 and 2, I first examine the relationship between regime transition 
and conflict onset, including the conflict controls. Then, I collapse absolute change and direction 
as Gleditsch and Ward (1998) did. Lastly, I regress the interactions of the combined change 
variable with power and contiguity against MID onset.  
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TABLE 3: Poisson Regression Estimates for Probability of Militarized Interstate Disputes 1950-2000 
 
Variable 
 
Poisson  Model 1 
 
Poisson Model 2 
 
Poisson Model 3 
 
Poisson Model 4 
Absolute Change -0.059*** 
(0.0205)  
  ―   ―   ― 
Magnitude and 
Direction of 
Change combined 
   ― -0.038*** 
(0.012) 
-0.024*    
(0.013) 
-0.0338***   
(0.0125) 
Direction of 
Change 
-0.363*** 
(0.0704) 
  ―   ―   ― 
Variance 0.0170*** 
(0.0067) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.0036 
(0.0047) 
0.0027 
(0.0047) 
Polity Score, 
lagged 
0.005 
(0.0065) 
0.005    
(0.007) 
0.0057 
(0.0067) 
0.0055 
(0.0066) 
Preference 
similarity 
-0.481* 
(0.2715) 
-0.474* 
(0.270) 
-0.505* 
(0.274) 
-0.470* 
(0.270) 
Capabilitiesa 12.924*** 
(0.797) 
12.848***   
(0.806) 
12.939***    
(0.811) 
12.835*** 
(0.804) 
Contiguitya 0.029*** 
(0.011) 
0.025** 
(0.011) 
0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.0305*** 
(0.0113) 
Change 
*Capabilities 
  ―   ― -0.010**   
(0.0048)   
  ― 
Change 
*Contiguity 
  ―   ―   ― -0.0053*   
(0.00299) 
Constant 
 
-0.9177***    
(0.182) 
-0.908***   
(0.182) 
-0.836***    
(0.188)   
-0.772*** 
(0.146) 
N=2410 
Note: Coefficients are estimated using generalized estimating equation for a poisson family and a log link function. 
The correlation matrix is specified as an AR1 process. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
a Mean centered values of capabilities and contiguity are used for the interaction terms. 
*** p < .01  
 **  p < .05  
 
 
The results of the first model specification are very similar to the equivalent logit model. 
Democratization reduces conflict propensities and this result is significant at the 0.01 level.  
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Figure 5
Direction of Poli ty  Change and Annual MID Occurrence
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Autocratizing states have higher probabilities of a one or more MID occurrence per 
country-year in comparison with stable and democratizing states. Democratizing countries have a 
78% probability not to experience a MID in any given country year. For autocratizing states, this 
probability is about 20% lower. For the probability of one MID onset per year, the probability for 
democratizing states decreases to 20%, whereas autocratizing states have a 35% probability to 
engage in military use of force once per country year.  
Variance is positively related to conflict in the first model, suggesting that highly volatile 
transitions increase the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes. 
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Figure 6: Polity Variance and Annual MID Occurrence
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Figure 6 shows that countries experiencing high changes in polity scores are more likely 
to experience conflict for a zero MID occurrence. Yet, the probability of one or more MID 
occurrences is only slightly higher for countries experiencing high changes than for countries 
having low variance in polity scores. Absolute change is negatively related to conflict in model 
one, although I emphasize that one has to regard this finding with caution due to high 
multicollinearity with variance. Power and contiguity have a strong and positive impact on MID 
occurrence which is robust for all models and consistent with the logistic regression results.  
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Figure 7: National Capabilities and Annual MID Occurrence
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The graph shows that powerful states have significantly higher probabilities to be 
involved in one or more MIDs per country-year than weak ones. The current level of democracy 
has no impact on conflict likelihood in the first model. Preference similarity gets slightly 
significant in the poisson model at the 0.1 level, indicating that satisfaction with the status quo 
decreases conflict probabilities.  
The second model collapses direction of change and magnitude of change and supports 
the expectation gained for overall change toward democracy by the first model. As in the logit 
model, however, the relationship between variance and MID onset does not remain robust to 
model specification change. This might be because, one, high collinearity among the regime 
change variables increase the standard errors of the coefficients making statistical significance 
more difficult to uncover. Two, variance is only tenuously related to conflict onset and 
consequently the relationship is not robust to model changes (Gleditsch and Ward 2000). Three, 
noise in the data and in the measurement instrument clouds the relationship. Variance in the 
transition may be strongly related to conflict onset, but the precise measurement technique used 
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here to capture unevenness in transition may be problematic.56 Regarding the interaction terms, 
the findings are consistent with the logit models, indicating moderating effects of 
democratization on power and contiguity.  
The results of the poisson model are very similar to the results for the dichotomous 
dependent variable. Signs and significance levels of the variables correspond to the logit models. 
However, a poisson model is a theoretical improvement since it models the empirical distribution 
of the dependent variable under analysis. Yet, the poisson models suffer from the fact that the 
probability of observing more than two or three MIDs per country year is close to zero. I argue 
that the distinction between conflict and no conflict might be more important than the total 
number of conflicts occurring per country-year. In addition, the assumption of independence for 
the number of events occurring per country year in poisson models might be easily violated.57  
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Conclusion  
Policy makers in the European Union and the United States emphasize the promotion of 
democracy as an important foreign policy goal. This is based on the belief that democracies 
engage in a more peaceful foreign policy behavior. Empirical evidence indeed supports this 
notion, suggesting that democracies do not fight each other and that they are generally less 
conflict prone than non-democracies, although findings for the latter are somewhat more mixed. 
Theoretical arguments explaining the peace proneness of democracies center on norms, 
constraints or signaling explanations. Consolidated democracies are expected to be less conflict 
prone because of deepened norms, constraints on political elites and superior abilities to credibly 
signal their foreign policy preferences. Thus, increasing numbers of democracies may result in a 
more peaceful world. Yet, findings of the democratization literature at least indirectly challenge 
these conclusions. Incomplete transitions to democracy have been shown to be substantially 
more war prone than others (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002a, 2002b). Thus, the promotion of 
democracy as a means to achieve a more peaceful world might be dangerous at least in the short 
term. Still, other research does not support the above conclusion and indicates decreased conflict 
propensities for democratizing states (Gleditsch and Ward 1998, 2000).  
The lack of theoretical explanations for the conflict behavior of transitioning states and 
the mixed empirical evidence justify a reassessment. This research re-evaluates the relationship 
between regime transition and conflict employing variables measuring regime change that are 
similar to Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000). It is argued here that signaling models provide a 
useful explanation of the relationship between regime change and conflict likelihood. First, a 
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signaling argument suggests that states experiencing democratic reversals are more conflict 
prone since rocky transitions increase the uncertainty about a state’s foreign policy preferences. 
Unfortunately, this hypothesis is only partially supported depending on the different model 
specifications used. The research design used here suffers from multicollinearity problems since 
all variable are constructed using polity scores. Second, I expected that smooth change toward 
democracy decreases conflict. The growing importance of democratic institutions and norms will 
force political elites to consider audience costs when using military force. In addition, gradual 
change toward democracy will enhance the credibility of signals sent by democratic states and 
reduce uncertainty arising in crisis situations. This hypothesis is strongly supported in all models 
and also supports the impression given in the initial discussions of regime change and conflict in 
the Ukraine and Georgia.  It seems that negotiated transitions, although necessarily slowing 
progress, increase the chances for its peacefulness. Yet, the failure to find a significant 
relationship between stable democracy and conflict in the statistical analysis questions my 
theoretical argument. Evidence for a monadic democratic peace thus remains inconclusive.  
Additionally, this weakens most theoretical accounts given for the democratic peace, given their 
emphasis on the general pacific nature of democracies.  
This research contributes importantly to earlier work on democratization and conflict. 
First, I develop a more fully specified model by controlling for power, contiguity and preference 
similarity. Second, interactions effects show that democratization has a strong moderating effect 
on power and contiguity. This calls for a re-consideration of the assumption of state stability in 
the conflict literature. Third, I use two different operationalizations of my dependent variable, a 
dichotomous measure and a variable counting the number of events. In addition, I improve a 
variable operationalization in Gleditsch and Ward’s (1998, 2000) research design. By breaking 
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apart direction and change, we can better assess the impact of regime change and conflict. As the 
results show, I find that democratization reduces the likelihood of conflict, which is consistent 
over the different models. The results indicate that for the post-WW II period, change toward 
democracy substantially reduces conflict likelihood. As the time frame and dependent variable 
used in this research are very similar to Mansfield and Snyder (2002b), further research is 
necessary to explain the contending evidence. Although I certainly recognize that their regime 
change variable operationalization and the level of analysis is different from the one employed 
here, the inconsistency in results is still puzzling. Besides, earlier evidence that uneven 
transitions increase conflict propensities is partly supported by my models. Methodologically, 
this model is an improvement over earlier research as it corrects for cluster-specific and temporal 
dependence, which are likely to arise in pooled cross-sectional times-series data.  
However, this paper also has its limitations. Although the model does correct for 
temporal and within-panel dependence, it does not model spatial dependence between cross-
sections. Yet, it is likely that events such as violent conflict or transitions have an effect on 
neighboring states. Gleditsch and Ward (2000) heavily emphasize the importance of regional 
factors for democratization as well as war. They account for spatial correlation among countries 
by creating new local measures for spatial correlation that are in consequence interacted with 
variance in democracy and war. In addition, I neglect the impact of economic factors such as 
trade on conflict likelihood. However, since the main concern of this paper is the impact of 
regime change on conflict likelihood, the inclusion of economic factors could prove difficult 
since it is not clear yet how democratization and economic development are related (Przeworski 
(1991). More importantly, this research does not look at civil conflict. Since transitions almost 
always involve some form of internal conflict (strikes, mass protest, civil strive), it might be 
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problematic to test the impact of democratization on interstate conflict only. With increasingly 
better data on civil wars and political violence, it might be fitting to employ civil conflict as an 
independent or dependent variable. Related to this, then, is the need to better explain the link 
between civil and interstate conflict in future research. Why do some civil conflicts externalize 
whereas others do not?  
The perilous polities, then, are countries that are strongly autocratizing, powerful and 
share a high number of borders with other states. The results do not support the dangerous 
democratization hypothesis.   
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Appendix 
Codebook 
 
 
Variable 
 
Variable 
Name 
Dataset 
 
Variable 
Description 
 
Measurement 
Level 
 
Calculation 
 
Source 
Country 
Code 
ccode Panel ID 
variable, 
identifies each 
country that is 
member of 
state system 
with a code 
number 
  EUgene  
Year year Time 
variable, 
Takes 1950 to 
2001 for each 
country if 
member of 
state system 
  EUgene 
Militarized 
Interstate 
Dispute 
mid Violent 
interstate 
conflict 
Dichotomous 
0=no MID, 
1=MID 
 MID 3.1 
update 
 
All MIDs allmids Number of 
MIDs in 
every country 
year 
Ordinal scale, 
range from 0 
to 25 
 MID 
3.1dataset 
 
Total 
change in 
Democracy 
Score 
 
Demchg10 
Magnitude 
and Direction 
of change in 
Democracy 
Score 
Ordinal Scale, 
Ranging from 
–20 to 20 
10xitxitxit −=  Polity IV 
Absolute 
Change in 
Democracy 
Score 
 
abschg10 
 
Absolute 
change in 
democraccy 
level over 10 
years 
Ordinal Scale, 
ranging from 
0 to 20 
 Polity IV 
. 
  75 
    
Direction 
of Change 
 
dirchg10 
 
Direction of 
change in 
democracy 
level, going 
from 
autocratizing 
(-1), no 
change (0) to 
democratizing 
(1) 
Ordinal scale, 
taking values 
–1,0,1 
x x
x x
x x
n
i nationi
t time
i t i t n
i t i t n
i t i t n
, ,
, ,
, ,
, ,
< − > −
= − >
> − >
=
=
=
−
−
−
1
0
1
510 15
 
Polity IV 
Variance of 
Change 
 
variance 
Variation in 
democracy 
score for the 
past 10 years 
continuous 
1 1
10
510
11
2
n
x x
n
i t i t
t
n
t
n
, ,
,
−





=
==
∑∑  
Polity IV 
Current 
Level of 
Democracy 
demlg Combined 
Democracy 
score for each 
country year, 
lagged one 
year 
Ordinal, 
Ranging from 
–10 to 10 
 Polity IV 
Power cap CINC score 
measuring 
national 
capabilities 
continuous  EUgene, 
CINC 
score 
update 
Contiguity totalcon Number of 
neighbors of 
every state 
system 
member 
Ordinal, 
ranging from 
1 to 28 
 Stinett et 
al. 2002 
Satisfaction 
with Status 
Quo 
s_lead Similarity of 
foreign policy 
positions with 
system leader 
Continuous, 
from –1 to 1 
 EUgene 
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